For those in the former Soviet Bloc, 1989 has been called an annus mirabilis—a year of miracles. With astonishing speed, communist rule ended in Eastern Europe, the Berlin Wall came tumbling down, and the nature of Europe was changed entirely. Two decades after the collapse of communism, many in those countries found themselves unsure of what, precisely, they were celebrating. Did 1989 really mark a moment of out-with-the-old-and-in-with-the-new, and how much had really changed in the intervening years?

Politically, all were authoritarian states governed by a ruling party. Each had propaganda writers to tell people what to think, secret police to detect dissidence, and prison camps to house regime critics and other criminals. All held “elections” in which the party won more than 95 percent of the vote. From command economies, the post-communist countries became on average more market friendly than the rest of the world. Democracy was surging worldwide in these years. But in the post-communist countries, it surged faster. Today, the average post-communist country is exactly as democratic as its income level would predict. Of 29 post-communist countries, 22 are rated 80 or higher, the threshold to be considered democratic, and six have perfect scores of 100. These countries also demilitarized. For much of the transition period, post-communist citizens were less likely to say they were happy than their peers elsewhere. But in the latest round of the World Values Survey, conducted in 2010-14, that gap had closed. Worldwide, 84 percent reported being “very” or “quite” happy. In the average post-communist country, it was 81 percent. For their income levels, they were about as happy as one would expect. Twenty-five years ago, the countries of the Soviet Bloc represented an alternative model, even civilization. Market reforms, attempts to build democracy, and struggles against corruption were not failures, although they remain incomplete.

Measured by different indicators, the revitalization of religion was a part of overall social changes in all countries, although to different extents and in different time frames. However, a distinction should be made between the revitalization visible in the public appearance and role of religion and the revitalization visible in the rise of individual religiosity according to different indicators like belonging, church participation, belief in God and particularly behavioural consequences of religious believing. As expected, participation at services is lower than other dimensions of religiosity in the majority of countries. The exception is Poland with a very high participation rate, followed by Romania, Slovakia and Croatia. Of particular interest is Bulgaria, with a much lower participation rate in comparison to other religiosity indicators. Romania also has a lower participation rate in contrast to the very high religiosity indicators in the country, which can be an indication of the “Orthodox specificities” of these two countries. In sum, religiosity is markedly present in countries analysed, though there are significant differences among them.

The crucial insight into the role of churches in post-communist societies comes from the questions about church institutions like kindergartens, schools, retirement homes, hospitals, unions and media: do we have too little of them or too many? Do we want to have them or not? Most importantly, who should finance them? These questions also illustrate respondents’ views on the ability of state and different private institutions in satisfying their social needs. Different views about donations to churches, which is demonstrated by the majority of answers being affirmative in Croatia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, whilst not in others. Bulgaria and Romania are also Orthodox countries in which state involvement in religious matters is historically higher than in Catholic or Protestant countries. That points to other social and cultural factors that are relevant for the creating and sustaining of church-state relations. People expect much from churches and, although there are normative expectations that churches should respect functional differentiation in modern societies, the situation has been extremely complicated.

Central and eastern European nations that joined the EU generally appreciated the institution and felt it had been good for their countries. Russia and Ukraine did not join, the situation looked very different, They are less approving of the shifts to democracy and capitalism, less supportive of specific democratic principles, and less satisfied with their lives. The outlook for Communism was grim. The first flames of revolution in Central Europe in the aftermath of World War I had been extinguished. The Communist parties elsewhere were small and beleaguered. Does that mean the American-forged modernity of unapologetically consumerist is the future of the World?