Ponmala
Come 24 February 2026 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine will have completed four years. At 11.00 in the morning a Russian fleet of trucks, armoured personal carriers and other vehicles departed from the southern part of Belarus towards Ukraine’s capital Kiev. It represented the main component of Russia’s miliary offensive. It was followed in its tail by a 64-kilometre long convoy that would ensure the inevitable end of the Ukraine State. About six hours earlier, Vladamir Putin had gone on Russian national television to announce the start of the special military operation against Ukraine. In the meanwhile, Ukrainian president Zelensky was organising what seemed like a final stand against the Russian invasion.
Judging that the fall of Kiev was inevitable, Western partners offered to evacuate Zelensky so that he could start a government in exile. His response was, “The fight is here. I need ammunition, not a ride.” At that time, Russia was the second or third military power in the world. By comparison, Ukraine’s military was a drop in the bucket. The Russian convoy would have taken less than two hours to reach Kiev under normal circumstances. But the circumstances were anything but normal. The convoy was timed to reach around midnight and capture Kiev in three days. However, Ukraine would survive the first day, then the second day, then a week, and then four years.
By 11 March 2022, the dreaded Russian convoy had dispersed. Six days later, Ukraine would begin a true counter attack. By 29 March, Russia announced its plan to retreat from the area. A miracle hadn’t brought it about; a combination of Ukrainian ingenuity and Russian missteps made it happen. By the end of 2021, Vladamir Putin had calculated that a modest mobilisation was his best choice for the operation. But he had miscalculated that his military was fully ready and their equipments were top notch. He also blindly trusted in the intelligence he received that a sizeable portion of Ukrainians would welcome his army with open arms. He expected Zelensky to flee to a foreign country just as Afghanistan’s president Ashraf Ghani had done. Eight years earlier, Ukraine’s president Victor Yanukovych had also fled to Russia in the face of nationwide protest.
A booming economy and America’s decision to stay away from military involvement in foreign countries aroused in Putin imperial ambitions to recreate Tzarist Russia or the Russia of the Soviet Union era. Ukraine’s doughty resistance has all but reduced it into a pipe dream. Ukraine was expected to have 200,000 troops. Russia mobilised the same quantity. However, they needed to have a 3 to 1 advantage to conduct a successful operation. Putin kept his plan to invade Ukraine a closely guarded secret even from many of his very senior military officers. That caused the Western allies to make varied assessment of the threat of Russian invasion of Ukraine. What’s more, Ukraine too believed no such immediate threat existed. Putin on his part was convinced that the invasion would evoke no worse reaction from the West than when he grabbed Crimea.
And he smartly created a smoke screen for the invasion by holding serious negotiations with the West, especially with Macron of France.
The Russian troops that were assembled in Belarus were under the impression that they were there for training exercises. That brought the traditional corruption that plagued their ranks into full display. The copper wiring and fuel in battle tanks and other equipments fetched them good money in the black market to buy vodka. And far from receiving the world’s best technology, they lacked even the required basic tools. In the absence of dedicated means of communication, they had to use their own cell phones, giving away their locations to the enemy. Meanwhile, Ukraine had covertly despatched spies across the border to study Russia’s preparations for an invasion. That provided them reliable information that Russia had never resolved the scourge of corruption in its army despite taking many steps to that end.
To have a fighting chance in the war, all Ukraine needed was to hold on for 72 hours, at which point Russian equipments would run out of fuel and start breaking down. They achieved that, forcing the Russians to back down from capturing Kiev. When they started to retreat, Ukrainian soldiers waited for the Russian vehicles at ambush points. They immobilised the first and the last vehicle in the approaching convoys. The Russian soldiers abandoned their vehicles and ran. Ukraine had saved Kiev and the trophy Putin had sought went out of his reach. Finally, on 29 March Russia announced it was abandoning the Kiev front and redeploying its forces to the south and the east. By April, Ukraine had regained all its lost territory. It was a series of blunders that prevented Russia from gaining a quick victory.
Russia now has 20% of Ukraine territory. Of this 12% was captured during the past 4 years. But, in the bargain it has suffered colossal losses in its military prestige, global standing, finance and able-bodied and educationally qualified youth. Around 700,000 of Russians have fled conscription to neighbouring countries. It has lost over 1.2 million soldiers, dead or seriously wounded. The loss of military hardware is estimated to be 11, 600 tanks, 23, 950 armoured vehicles, 36, 650 artillery systems, 1,626 MLRSs, 434 planes, 347 helicopters, 1,15, 800 UAVs, 4, 205 cruise missiles, 28 ships, 2 submarines, 75, 900 cars and cisterns, 1, 286 anti-aircraft systems and 4050 special equipments.
The most humiliating part of it for Russia is that it had to hire North Korean soldiers and militia and depend on the import of military hardware from other nations. A badly battered and bruised Ukraine on the other hand stands tall as a proud independent nation. Negotiations to end the war is extending like a mirage. Russia has achieved none of the goals of the war. Most importantly, the war has put an end to Putin’s imperial ambitions. Is Trump listening?
